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It’s Time to Resolve the Circuit
Split: Unconstitutional Actions by
Federal Employees Should Not Fall
Within the Scope of the
Discretionary Function Exception
of the FTCA
Laney Ivey*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA) is an avenue for United States
citizens to sue the federal government for torts committed by
government employees within the scope of their work. Congress
designed the FTCA to allow citizens to overcome the doctrine of
sovereign immunity, which allows citizens to recover from injuries
suffered at the hands of government agents. Under the FTCA, there are
exceptions where recovery is not allowed; the most prominent exception
is known as the discretionary function exception, under which
discretionary actions by government employees are immune from
liability under the FTCA.
The intent of the discretionary function exception is to keep the
courts from second guessing discretionary actions by executive
employees, and to keep executive employees from being hesitant to
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exercise discretion for fear of liability.1 The scope of the discretionary
function exception is much litigated and one legal issue that has arisen
is whether unconstitutional actions by an executive official can ever fall
within the exception. There is currently a circuit split regarding
whether unconstitutional actions fall within the exception. The First,
Third, Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits all believe unconstitutional
actions should not fall within the exception, while the Seventh and
Eleventh Circuits believe they should. The Supreme Court of the
United States has yet to weigh in on the issue and has not commented
on the ambiguity surrounding the exception in over twenty-five years.
This Comment will argue that unconstitutional actions are outside the
scope of discretion provided by the exception, and therefore should be
excluded from the exception.
From the inception of the FTCA, the scope and implication of the
discretionary function exception has been extensively litigated. Faced
with a lack of clarity in the statute, courts have wrestled with
articulating the functions that Congress intended to be “discretionary,”
and thus prohibiting civil liability. The underlying theme throughout
the cases debating the discretionary function exception is that the core
purpose of the FTCA is to hold the Government responsible for the
harm it causes.
The FTCA radically changed the way citizens seek relief for their
claims against the government. Before the adoption of the FTCA,
citizens could not sue the federal government for negligent acts
committed by a government official. Sovereign immunity protected
these officials, regardless of how egregious their actions were.2 While
there were options available to citizens seeking relief, they were limited
to seeking a private action bill.3 Hoping to make a change, which would
allow for Americans to seek redress for tortious actions by the
government, Congress passed the FTCA.4
The goal of this Article is to expound on various courts’
interpretations of the discretionary function exception, and to offer an
opinion on the current divide, as well as a workable test which would
remedy the confusion surrounding the exclusion of unconstitutional
actions from the exception. First, this Article discusses the history of
sovereign immunity within the United States, and the process a citizen
would have to undertake to seek redress in a suit against a government
1. KEVIN M. LEWIS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45732, THE FEDERAL TORTS CLAIMS ACT
(FTCA): A LEGAL OVERVIEW 18 (2019).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 4.
4. Id. at 4–5.
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entity. Next, it will address the FTCA and its creation, along with
Congress’s considerations in their drafting of the legislation.
Following the background of the FTCA, the focus will shift to the
discretionary function exception. This Comment will address the
function and purpose of the exception, as well as the test commonly
used in cases where sovereign immunity and a discretionary action are
at play. This Comment will then turn to the different stances of the
judicial circuits who have issued opinions regarding whether
unconstitutional actions by a government employee fall within the
scope of the discretionary function exception. Finally, this Comment
will offer a solution to the split, commenting on the need for a Supreme
Court opinion clarifying the discretionary function exception and
highlighting the three main areas of contention and the concerns of
those for the inclusion.
II. BEFORE AND AFTER THE FEDERAL TORTS CLAIMS ACT
A. The History of Sovereign Immunity and Redress for Torts Claims
Prior to the FTCA
Sovereign immunity is a key foundation of the FTCA.5 The doctrine
of sovereign immunity permits a sovereign state or entity to be sued
only to the extent that it has consented to being sued, and such
permission can only be given by the legislative branch.6 “Thus, except
as Congress has consented to a cause of action against the United
States, ‘there is no jurisdiction . . . in any . . . court to entertain suits
against the United States.’”7 This body of law is the shield protecting
the United States from suit.
Before the creation of the FTCA, or any other applicable waiver of
sovereign immunity, Americans injured by torts of government officials
could not sue the government for damages resulting from their
injuries.8 However, this did not leave Americans without a remedy, as
the First Amendment guaranteed their right to petition the government
for redress.9 The issue of establishing an efficient way for Americans to
seek redress is not new. Even in the beginning years of the country,

5. See Paul F. Figley, & Jay Tidmarsh, The Appropriations Power and Sovereign
Immunity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1207 (2009).
6. Figley, Paul F., Understanding the Federal Tort Claims Act: A Different
Metaphor, 44 TORT TRIAL & INSURANCE PRACTICE LAW JOURNAL 1105, 1107 (2009).
7. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976) (quoting United States v.
Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 587–88 (1941)).
8. See generally Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 375, 411–12 (1821).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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citizens petitioned Congress for special legislation which would grant
an avenue for financial recovery for injuries caused by the federal
government.10 However, time proved that the legislative process was illsuited for resolving tort claims, with many leaders calling for a
change.11
Congress introduced and adopted a wide variety of remedies for a
range of claims, however, none of them offered a remedy for tort
actions. First, in 1855, Congress passed the Court of Claims Act,12
however, it was interpreted to exclude torts.13 Next, in 1886, Congress
enacted the Tucker Act,14 which explicitly excluded torts, as the
government did not want to waive sovereign immunity.15 In the years
following the Tucker Act, there were a number of statutes passed which
offered a tort remedy for various claimants including “horse owners,
oyster growers, and persons injured by operations of the Post Office.”16
From the early 1920s forward, pressure mounted for the enactment
of a law that would more efficiently process tort claims against the
government. Congress wrestled with the issue for over twenty years,
which resulted in over thirty potential bills regarding tort claim
redress.17 At this point in time, the only opportunity for a citizen to seek
compensatory relief was through a private congressional bill.18 Private
bills “impose[d] ‘a substantial burden on the time and attention of
Congress,’ [and] some members of the public became increasingly
concerned ‘that the private bill system was unjust and wrought with
10. Figley, supra note 6, at 1106–07.
11. Paul Figley, Ethical Intersections & The Federal Tort Claims Act: An Approach
for Government Attorneys, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 347, 347 (2011). For example, John
Quincy Adams complained about the inordinate time Congress spent on claims matters;
Millard Fillmore urged that a tribunal be established to handle private claims; and
Abraham Lincoln called for such a change in his first annual message to Congress.
12. Court of Claims Act, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612 (1855).
13. The Court of Claims Act was enacted February 24, 1855, 10 Stat. 612, Spicer v.
United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 316 (1865); Pitcher v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 7 (1863).
14. Tucker Act, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a),
1491 (1887)).
15. The Tucker Act “provides a remedy for actions ‘not sounding in tort,’ although the
original House version had included torts. 18 CONG. REC. 622 (1887).” Figley, supra note
6, at n.22.
16. Figley, supra note 6, at 1107.
17. 2 Jayson & Longstreth, Handling Federal Tort Claims § 12.06 (2021).
18. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 25 n.9 (1953). A private bill is a bill
which relates to the matter of personal or local interest. These bills are typically
introduced by a member of the legislature, and at one point, were used as a way to seek
redress against the government. If the bill did not pass, there would be no other way to
seek redress. Bill (3), BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
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political favoritism.’”19 However, the administration of these claims
became burdensome, as seen during the Seventieth Congress, where
2,268 private claim bills were introduced, totaling more than $100
million in damages.20 Of the 2,268 private claim bills that were
introduced, only a 336 were enacted.21
The issue came to a head in 1945 when a B-25 bomber plane crashed
into the Empire State Building.22 The crash, caused by a negligent
United States Army Air Force pilot, left fourteen people dead and many
others injured. Eight months after the crash, the U.S. government
offered money to families of the victims. Some accepted, but others
initiated a lawsuit that resulted in landmark legislation.23
B. The FTCA is Born
Hoping to end the inefficient system and fueled by lawsuits following
the 1945 Empire State Building crash, the 79th Congress set out to
resolve the burden of a faulty remedy system for tort claims in 1946.24
Thus the Federal Torts Claims Act was born. The purpose of this act is
to give the general public an avenue by which they can pursue legal
action (and financial compensation) against the federal government.25
The drafters of the FTCA imagined an act where citizens could
circumvent the doctrine of sovereign immunity and have their day in
court for any nonfeasance or misfeasance created by the government or
those acting on behalf of the government.26
A person injured by the tortious activity of a federal employee
commonly has two potential targets that he could name as a defendant
in a tort lawsuit: (1) the federal employee who committed the tort and
(2) the federal government itself.27 In numerous cases, however, suing
the employee is not a viable option.28 The FTCA generally authorizes
suits against the United States for damages arising out of:
19. Lewis, supra note 1, at 4.
20. Dalehite, 346 U.S. 15, 25 n.9 (1953) (discussing the haphazard operation of the
private claim bill procedure).
21. Id.
22. Joe Richman, The Day A Bomber Hit The Empire State Building, NPR (July 28,
2008, 11:23 AM), https://www.npr.org/transcripts/92987873.
23. Richman, supra note 22.
24. Title IV of the Legislative Reorganization Act, ch. 753, §§ 401–24, 60 Stat. 842
(1946) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2671–80).
25. See Shivers v. United States, 1 F.4th 924 (11th Cir. 2021).
26. See Paul Figley, Ethical Intersections & The Federal Tort Claims Act: An
Approach for Government Attorneys, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 347, 351–52 (2011).
27. See Harbury v. Hayden, 522 F.3d 413, 417 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
28. Id.
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[I]njury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the
negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the
Government while acting within the scope of his office or
employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a
private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the
law of the place where the act or omission occurred.29

“Under the FTCA, the federal government acts as a self-insurer, and
recognizes liability” for the tortious actions “of its employees acting
within the scope of” their sanctioned duties.30 “The United States is
liable to the same extent” a private individual would be in similar
circumstances.31 The FTCA does not itself create a new federal cause of
action against the U.S.; instead, the FTCA waives the U.S’s sovereign
immunity from certain claims that exist under state tort law.32
Therefore, the liability of the United States in an FTCA case is typically
determined by the substantive law of the state where the tort
occurred.33
The FTCA imposes significant substantive limitations on the type of
tort claim an American may recover from the United States. At the time
of enactment, Congress was concerned about “unwarranted judicial
intrusion[s] into areas of government . . . policymaking[,]”34 thus,
Congress opted to explicitly protect the United States’ sovereign
immunity for more than a dozen different claims.35 Some of the
exceptions are more notable than others. For example, the following
exceptions prevent Americans from pursuing lawsuits against the
United States: “[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an
employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a

29. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1996).
30. Federal Torts Claims Act, UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
https://www.house.gov/doing-business-with-the-house/leases/federal-tort-claims-act (last
visited October 29, 2021).
31. Id.
32. Pornomo v. United States, 814 F.3d 681, 687 (4th Cir. 2016) (“The FTCA does not
create a new cause of action; rather, it permits the United States to be held liable in tort
by providing a limited waiver of sovereign immunity.”); Raplee v. United States, 842 F.3d
328, 331 (4th Cir. 2016) (explaining that “the FTCA merely waives sovereign immunity to
make the United States amenable to a state tort suit.”).
33. Raplee, 842 F.3d at 331.
34. Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490, 506 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The D.C. Circuit, in determining
whether a claim of malicious prosecution was protected by sovereign immunity held that
“[p]rosecutorial decisions . . . are quintessential examples of governmental discretion in
enforcing the criminal law,” and have uniformly been protected under the discretionary
function exception. Id. at 513.
35. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)–(f), (h)–(n) (2021).
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statute or regulation . . . or based upon the exercise or performance or
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty;”36
certain claims arising from the actions of law enforcement officers
administering customs and excise laws;37 or certain claims predicated
upon intentional torts committed by federal employees.38 If a tort claim
against the United States falls within any of the exceptions, then the
court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate it.
C. The Discretionary Function Exception
1. The Function and Purpose of the Discretionary Function
Exception
The discretionary function exception is considered the most litigated
exception to the FTCA.39 When a court is determining whether the
alleged tortious conduct is discretionary in nature, the court must
assess “whether the conduct at issue involves ‘an element of judgment
or choice’ by the employee.”40 Generally, the conduct of a federal
employee is considered to be discretionary absent any federal statute,
regulation, or other policy.41 Without the presence of a discretionary
action there is nothing for the exception to protect.42 Put another way,
the discretionary function exception does not insulate the United States
from liability when its employees “act in violation of a statute or policy
that specifically directs them to act otherwise.”43
Section 2680(a) of the United States Code is commonly referred to as
the discretionary function exception.44 This section preserves the
immunity granted to the federal government whenever an employee’s
36. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2021).
37. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) (2021).
38. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2021).
39. See, e.g., Matthews v. United States, No. 07-00030, 2011 Lexis 86282, at 2 (D.
Guam Aug. 5, 2011), aff’d, 586 F. App’x 366 (9th Cir. 2014) (describing “the discretionary
function exception” as “the most frequently litigated” statutory exception to the FTCA).
40. Pornomo, 814 F.3d at 687.
41. Evans v. United States, 876 F.3d 375, 381 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting Berkovitz ex
rel. Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988)).
42. Berkovitz ex rel. Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988).
43. Tsolmon v. United States, 841 F.3d 378, 384 (5th Cir. 2016).
44. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (stating the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity “shall
not apply to . . . [a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the
Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or
not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the
failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal
agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be
abused.”).
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acts involve the exercise of judgement or choice.45 The discretionary
function exception is often referred to as the broadest and most
consequential exception to the FTCA.46 The United States has
successfully avoided tort liability via the discretionary function
exception in cases involving exposures “to radiation, asbestos, Agent
Orange, and . . . the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).”47
The discretionary function exception serves at least two different
purposes. First, the exception “prevent[s] judicial ‘second-guessing’ of
legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic,
and political policy through the medium of an action in tort.”48 Some
commentators presume that the Congress which enacted the FTCA
viewed the “second-guessing” to be incongruous.49 The dual reasoning
behind this belief is that “(1) ‘such judgments are more appropriately
left to the political branches of our governmental system;’ and (2)
‘courts, which specialize in the resolution of discrete factual and legal
disputes,’ may not be ‘equipped to make broad policy judgments.’”50
The second purported purpose of the discretionary function exception
is to protect the government from any liability that would seriously
hinder governmental operations.51 The insulating qualities of the
discretionary function exception arguably decrease the likelihood that
federal employees will “shy away from making sound policy decisions
based on a fear of increasing the government’s exposure to tort
liability.”52 On a similar note, the risk of exposure to liability for
discretionary actions could cause the United States to expend an
exorbitant amount of tax-payer money responding to frivolous lawsuits
rather than allotting the money to worthwhile community issues.53

45. Tsolmon, 841 F.3d at 380.
46. Mark C. Niles, “Nothing But Mischief”: The Federal Tort Claims Act and the
Scope of Discretionary Immunity, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1275, 1309 (2002).
47. Richard H. Seamon, Causation and the Discretionary Function Exception to the
Federal Tort Claims Act, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 691, 694 (1997).
48. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536–37 (quoting United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao
Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 814 (1984)).
49. Lewis, supra note 1, at 18.
50. Id. at 19.
51. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 814 (quoting United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150,
163 (1963)).
52. Lewis, supra note 1, at 18.
53. Id. at 19.
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2. The Gaubert Test and the Discretionary Function
Exception
The discretionary function exception is riddled with holes left by the
courts. In Gaubert v. United States,54 the Supreme Court of the United
States attempted to remedy a portion of the confusion by outlining a
test to determine whether an action is discretionary. The Supreme
Court was aware of the issue of whether daily managerial and
mandated actions were discretionary, and the arguments of both sides
stating that:
If the employee violates the mandatory regulation, there will be no
shelter from liability because there is no room for choice and the
action will be contrary to policy. On the other hand, if a regulation
allows the employee discretion, the very existence of the regulation
creates a strong presumption that a discretionary act authorized by
the regulation involves consideration of the same policies which led
to the promulgation of the regulations.55

While Gaubert only scratches the surface of actions that may or may
not fall under the discretionary function exception, it provides relevant
case law and background to guide courts.
The Supreme Court in Gaubert established a two-prong test aimed at
governing the application of the discretionary function exception.56 In
the test, the Supreme Court expressly instructed courts how to
determine whether challenged government conduct involves “a
discretionary function or duty” for purposes of section 2680(a)’s
exception.57 First, a court must establish whether the conduct
challenged by the plaintiff was “discretionary in nature”—that is,
whether it involved “an element of judgment or choice.”58 Citing Schuler
v. United States,59 the court stated that if an exercise of discretion is
involved, then consistent with the last clause of the exception, “the
discretionary function exception immunizes even government abuses of
discretion.”60 Thus, the exception does not apply to any claim where a
government official failed to perform its clear duty, or to act in
accordance with a specific mandate.61

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

499 U.S. 315 (1991).
Id. at 324.
Id. at 322–23.
Id. at 322.
Id. (quoting Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536).
531 F.3d 930 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 935.
Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 544.
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Second, a court must evaluate “whether that judgment [or choice] is
of the kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to
shield.”62 Because Congress sought to prevent judicial second guessing
of legislative and administrative decisions that are based on social,
economic, and political policy through tort actions, when construed
properly, the exception only protects governmental actions and
decisions based on public policy.63 In other words, courts should look at
whether the tortious action complained of was that which Congress
passed the FTCA to protect. Most FTCA cases involving the
discretionary function exception hinge on the critical inquiry of whether
the category or type of challenged government activity is discretionary
under Gaubert.
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT ON THE EXCLUSION OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL
ACTIONS FROM THE SCOPE OF THE FTCA
A. The Discretionary Function Exception Excludes Immunity for
Unconstitutional Actions
1. The Third Circuit
The Third Circuit was one of the first to comment on
unconstitutional actions falling outside the scope of the discretionary
function exception. In Pooler v. United States,64 the Third Circuit was
faced with a dual issue of unlawful arrest and unlawful prosecution, yet
it did not issue a ruling based off unconstitutional actions by a
government defendant in an FTCA claim.65 Instead, in dicta
surrounding tortious actions by the government, the court reasoned
that if the complaint in the case at hand were to have alleged that the
agents of the government, in the course of their investigation, had in
fact violated the constitutional rights or federal statutes, the outcome
would have shifted because federal employees do not possess discretion
to violate the Constitution or other regulations.66
While the court did not base its decision on unconstitutional actions
that did not occur, their comment as to what would happen if there
were to be unconstitutional acts interwoven sheds light on the ongoing
issue of defining the scope of the discretionary function exception. The
court here took the time to explain the discretionary function exception,
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 536.
Shuler, 531 F.3d at 933.
787 F.2d 868 (3d Cir. 1986).
Id. at 871.
Id.
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drawing a line between decisions that are made at a planning level in
relation to those that are made at an operational level.67 The court held
that although the defendant is not a high-level official, he is still a
government official who had to exercise judgment as to policy decisions
and the extent of control needed in working with an informant.68 Thus,
the actions of the defendant fell under the discretionary function
exception.69
Judge Seitz, in his concurrence, focused on discussing the vague
contours and wide breadth of the discretionary function exception.70
This is a recurring issue that the unconstitutional actions question falls
under. Judge Seitz turned to the Supreme Court of the United States’
recent decision in Dalehite, where the court explained that “the basic
inquiry concerning the application of the . . . exception is whether the
challenged acts of the Government employee—whatever his or her
rank—are of the nature and quality that Congress intended to shield
from liability.”71 In his discussion of Dalehite, Judge Seitz shed light on
a crucial question: at the creation of the discretionary function
exception, did Congress intend for it to apply to unconstitutional actions
by federal employees? The Third Circuit answered this by holding that
the discretionary function does not apply to unconstitutional actions,
arguing there is no discretion in the violation of the law.72
2. The Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit, along with Pooler, helped to pave the way for
sister circuits in holding that unconstitutional actions do not fall under
the scope of the discretionary function exception of the FTCA. In the
2000 case Nurse v. United States,73 the plaintiff traveled from Canada
to the United States. Agents detained, arrested, and searched the
plaintiff at both the Vancouver and the Los Angeles (LA) airports.
Because he believed the search and arrest invaded his privacy, the
plaintiff filed suit against the United States and others. The district
court dismissed plaintiff’s entire complaint.74 On appeal, the court
reversed in part holding that the plaintiff’s complaint stated an

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 870.
Id. at 871.
Id. at 872.
Id. at 873.
Id. (quoting Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 813).
Id. at 871.
226 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 999–1000.
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adequate FTCA claim based on the discretionary act of policymaking.75
Typically, the discretionary function exception protects the
promulgation and enforcement of rules and policies.76
Here, the plaintiff alleged that the policymaking done by the
defendants was discriminatory and unconstitutional in nature.77 The
court sided with the plaintiff, stating that “[i]n general, governmental
conduct cannot be discretionary if it violates a legal mandate.”78
Following these principles, the court stated that it could not determine
at this stage in the proceedings whether the acts of the policymaking
violated the constitution, and if they did, what constitutional mandates
were violated.79 Because the alleged policy-making decisions of the
defendants could have been non-discretionary, the court reversed the
district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s FTCA claims.80 Thus, the
Ninth Circuit set a precedent that unconstitutional actions would be
barred from falling under the discretionary function exception of the
FTCA.
3. The Eighth Circuit
Raz v. United States,81 the Eighth Circuit’s 2003 opinion on the
discretionary function exception and unconstitutional actions, serves as
the beacon directing the circuit’s stance. While Raz has little detail of
the reasoning behind the court’s decision, it does serve as the precedent
for the circuit. Raz is based off the appellant’s contention that the FBI
illegally shadowed and harassed said appellant for several years.82 The
appellant contended that this stalking stemmed from his unpopular
political opinions, thus leading him to sue the government under the
FTCA, alleging the FBI’s conduct violated his First and Fourth
Amendment rights.83
The court did not dwell on the issue of whether unconstitutional
actions fall within the scope of the discretionary function exception;
instead, the court relied solely on Pooler in its decision.84 The court
ultimately held that the FBI’s alleged surveillance activities fall outside

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 1005.
Id. at 1002.
Id. at 1001.
Id. at 1002.
Id.
Id.
343 F.3d 945 (8th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 947.
Id.
Id. at 948.
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the scope of the discretionary function exception.85 Its reasoning behind
this decision was that Raz alleged the FBI’s actions violated his First
and Fourth amendment rights, thus mooting the idea that the FBI was
using any discretion in their choice of unconstitutional actions.86
4. The First Circuit
The First Circuit in Limone v. United States87 tackled whether
unconstitutional actions, when coupled with a tortious action, constitute
discretionary actions under the discretionary function exception of the
FTCA. The plaintiffs in the case, former prisoners and the estates of
two other prisoners, sued the United States under the FTCA.88 The case
was based principally on a cooperating witness’s testimony, which
allowed for the conviction of prisoners for murder, and resulted in stiff
sentences for all the prisoners.89 But as seen in the case, the basis for
the FTCA claim was the FBI’s failure to turn over exculpatory evidence
and a claim of malicious prosecution, which were categorized as
unconstitutional actions.90
Three decades after the plaintiffs were convicted for murder, the FBI
disclosed for the first time that it possessed reliable intelligence
undercutting the witness’s account of the murder and that it had
suppressed this intelligence. The FBI further disclosed that it had this
information throughout the trial proceedings. This information included
the realization that the key witness was the man who committed the
murder, not the other plaintiffs. Further, the FBI induced the witness
to cooperate and testify against the plaintiffs, even though there was a
strong belief that they were not the parties at fault for the murder.91
The resulting case addresses whether the actions of the United
States and its employees are exempt from liability under the FTCA’s
discretionary function exception. The First Circuit looked specifically at
the FBI’s actions to assist the witness in framing the prisoner plaintiffs
for a capital crime, and then further covering up the framing by
withholding exculpatory information from state officials.92 The
government argues that it possessed discretion to withhold exculpatory
information from state prosecutors in order to protect the security of its

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id.
579 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2009).
Id. at 83.
Id. at 86.
Id. at 89.
Id. at 86.
Id. at 101.
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sources, asking the court to conclude their actions were discretionary.
However, the First Circuit saw straight through their specious and selfserving argument.93
The court considered the exclusion of unconstitutional actions from
the discretionary function exception to be elementary in nature.94 It is
no secret that the discretionary function exception does not immunize
the government from liability for actions proscribed by federal statutes
or regulations.95 Further, the discretionary function exception does not
shield conduct that transgresses the Constitution.96 The district court in
this case earlier determined that the FBI’s conduct violated the
Constitution as well as guidelines set by the Department of Justice.97
Disregarding the government’s generalized argument, and relying on
Berkovitz, the court stated that “[v]iewed from 50,000 feet, virtually any
action can be characterized as discretionary.”98 But the discretionary
function exception requires courts to focus on the specific conduct at
issue, not a general belief that actions involving choice are
discretionary.99 Honing in on the action of the FBI, “warts and all,”
there was no illusion left that the conduct of the FBI was discretionary
in nature.100 Settling the issue at hand once and for all, the court held
that the FBI’s conduct was unconstitutional and thus fell out of the
sweep of the discretionary function exception.101 Much like in other
circuits, this decision firmly standardized the First Circuit’s precedent
and belief that unconstitutional actions by the government will not fall
within the discretionary function exception.
5. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit
The D.C. Circuit offers the most recent, as well as the most in-depth,
analysis of the discretionary function exception and its applicability to
unconstitutional actions by the government. The court in Loumiet v.
United States,102 much like the Eighth Circuit in Nurse, faced the
appeal of a district court’s dismissal of a case on the pleadings. In the

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 102.
828 F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
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early 2000s, Loumiet was on a team of attorneys hired by Hamilton
Bank to prepare an audit report during a securities-fraud investigation
of the bank by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). The
final audit report did not reach a conclusion as to whether the bank’s
executives engaged in wrongdoing. While the OCC contested these
findings, Loumiet and his team declined to alter their conclusions.103
Around that same time as the final report of the bank inspection,
Loumiet sent the Treasury Inspector General a series of letters in
which he expressed concern that “while on site at Hamilton Bank
during the OCC’s investigation, OCC employees had made racist
remarks regarding the bank’s Hispanic employees.”104 Following this
statement, the bank filed suit against the OCC in 2002, alleging civil
rights violations arising out of the investigation.105 Shortly thereafter,
the OCC closed Hamilton Bank for operating in a dangerous manner—a
closure “Loumiet allege[d] was unjustified and incurred considerable
unnecessary cost for the bank’s receiver . . . .”106 What followed was an
administrative proceeding brought by the OCC against Loumiet. These
proceedings ended with OCC dismissing the action. However, Loumiet
alleged in his complaint that they had a lasting effect on his life.107
Loumiet brought this suit for common-law tort claims under the
FTCA against the government for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, invasion of privacy, abuse of process, malicious prosecution,
negligent supervision, and civil conspiracy.108 On appeal, the D.C.
Circuit addressed whether the Constitution “places any limit on the
government[] policymaking discretion immunized by the discretionaryfunction exception to the [FTCA].”109 The court ultimately concluded, in
line with the majority of other circuit courts, that the discretionary
function exception does not bar FTCA claims where the government’s
tortious actions were outside of the government’s constitutional
authority to act.110
Delving into the court’s reasoning behind their ultimate conclusion,
the court first explained the process they followed in determining
whether conduct is discretionary.111 The court adhered to the test set up

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 938–39.
Id. at 939.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 939–40.
Id. at 939.
Id. at 938.
Id. at 939.
Id. at 941–42.
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in Gaubert, looking at whether there were judgment choices involved,
and whether the judgment choice was of the kind that the discretionary
rule was designed to protect.112 Following the precedent from other
circuits, the court reasoned that “[e]ven a discretionary act within the
scope of a federal official’s employment is not within the exception if it
‘cannot be said to be based on the purposes that the regulatory regime
seeks to accomplish.’”113
The court also wrestled with whether the discretionary function
exception protects the United States from tort liability under the FTCA
even when the otherwise discretionary conduct by the government
exceeds constitutional limits on the government’s authority to act.114
The parties disagreed on how the court should answer the question,
with plaintiff alleging that the defendant violated his First and Fifth
Amendment rights, thus relinquishing any right to the defense of
discretionary actions. The United States on the other hand, argued that
the FTCA does not waive sovereign immunity for constitutional torts;
thus, there can be no unconstitutional-discretion limitation on the
exception.115
The D.C. Circuit Court held that “the FTCA’s discretionary-function
exception does not provide a blanket immunity against tortious conduct
that a plaintiff plausibly alleges also flouts a constitutional
prescription.”116 The court noted that at least seven circuits, including
the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth, have either
held or stated in dicta that the discretionary-function exception does not
protect federal employees from FTCA liability when they exceed the
scope of their constitutional authority.117 Reviewing the case law from
other circuits, the court outlined previous decisions that also held that
unconstitutional actions do not fall under the discretionary function
exception, as well as the Seventh Circuit decision that goes against
precedent from other circuits.118
The court dwelled on the idea that there is no blanket exception for
discretion that exceeds constitutional bounds.119 Restating this concept
in multiple different ways, and applied to different circumstances, the
court explained that when a government official acts outside of the
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
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Id. at 942.
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Id. at 942–43.
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authority granted to him, he is not exercising the type of discretion
Congress intended the discretionary function exception to protect.120
The court ended its analysis by presenting the question of specificity of
constitutional mandates when determining the bounds of the
discretionary function exception in terms of unconstitutional actions.121
After a brief explanation of the government’s argument, the court
refused to set any type of test or limit when applying the exception to
unconstitutional actions, citing the lack of any similar case law in other
jurisdictions.122 Thus, the final outcome of the case upheld the FTCA
claims, with the court barring the generalized argument of the
government and focusing the ruling on the inapplicability of the
discretionary function exception to unconstitutional actions.123 The
court made it clear that barring an FTCA claim on the ground that, as a
general rule, “even constitutionally defective” exercises of discretion are
within the scope of the FTCA’s discretion, was an error by the lower
court.124
6. The Fifth Circuit’s Indecisiveness
The Fifth Circuit is unique in the sense that it issued an opinion
regarding unconstitutional actions not falling within the discretionary
function exception, then later vacated the decision. The Fifth Circuit
did not shy away from the issue in Sutton v. United States,125 where it
boldly held that “action does not fall within the discretionary function of
§ 2680(a) when governmental agents exceed the scope of their authority
as designated by statute or the Constitution.”126 Over twenty years
later, the court relied on Sutton to hold the discretionary function
exception inapplicable to conduct of a government official that was
alleged to have violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights of the
plaintiff.127
Castro v. United States,128 is considered the Fifth Circuit’s opinion
regarding the discretionary function exception and unconstitutional
actions, in which the court sided with its sister courts in holding that
the discretionary function barred claims involving unconstitutional
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122.
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Id. at 946.
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Id.
Sutton v. United States, 819 F.2d 1289 (5th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 1293.
Loumiet, 828 F.3d at 943 n.2.
560 F.3d 381, 389–90 (5th Cir. 2009).
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actions.129 However, the en banc Fifth Circuit summarily vacated the
previous Castro panel decision, but in so doing, specifically did not
address the interplay between constitutional allegations and the
discretionary function exception.130 Instead, the court adopted the prior
opinion of the district court, which was notably silent on the weight and
significance of the constitutional allegations brought by the plaintiff.131
Since this overruling, there has been little change in the court’s take on
the discretionary function exception. The court in Loumiet specifically
noted in a footnote that “[n]otwithstanding Sutton, the Fifth Circuit has
since observed that the circuit has ‘not yet determined whether a
constitutional violation, as opposed to a statutory, regulatory, or policy
violation, precludes the application of the discretionary function
exception.’”132
The Fifth Circuit’s stance on not issuing an opinion in the debate
over whether unconstitutional actions fall within the discretionary
function fits well with the state of the issue. Without a decision from
the Supreme Court clarifying the rules and creating a uniform
standard, circuits are going to interpret the exception in a broad
manner, seeking to stretch the truth and gain a stronger sense of
immunity.
B. The Discretionary Function Exception Includes Immunity for
Unconstitutional Actions
There are currently only two circuits that have ruled that
unconstitutional actions by government employees still fall within the
scope of the discretionary function exception.133 The Seventh Circuit in
Linder v. United States, 134 and Kiiskila v. United States, 135 vaguely
defined its reasoning for straying from its sister courts. On the other
hand, the Eleventh Circuit in Shivers v. United States,136 went into
detail as to the justifications of their ruling.

129. Id. at 392.
130. Loumiet, 828 F.3d at 943 n.3.
131. Id.
132. Id. (quoting Spotts v. United States, 613 F.3d 559, 569 (5th Cir. 2010)).
133. See Linder v. United States, 937 F.3d 1087 (7th Cir. 2019); Kiiskila v. United
States, 466 F.2d 626 (7th Cir. 1972); Shivers, 1 F.4th 924 (11th Cir. 2021).
134. 937 F.3d 1087 (7th Cir. 2019).
135. 466 F.2d 626.
136. 1 F.4th 924 (11th Cir. 2021).
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1. The Seventh Circuit
Kiiskila, decided in 1970, preceded many of the above-mentioned
cases where the courts held that unconstitutional actions do not fall
within the scope of the discretionary function exception of the FTCA.137
In Kiiskila, the plaintiff was a civilian office manager of a credit union
located on a military base. After allegations surfaced that the plaintiff
violated a base regulation, the base’s commanding officer permanently
barred the plaintiff from entry onto the base, thereby costing the
plaintiff her job.138 In an earlier appeal in the case, the Seventh Circuit
held that the exclusion of the plaintiff from the base and the resulting
loss of her job violated the First Amendment.139
On remand, the plaintiff amended her complaint to add a claim for
damages under the FTCA.140 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower
court’s ruling, holding that “her exclusion from Fort Sheridan was
based upon Colonel Nichols’ exercise of discretion, albeit
constitutionally repugnant, and therefore excepted her claim from the
reach of the [FTCA] under 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).”141 The court further
noted that the officer’s actions were both discretionary in nature, and
stated:
Of course, this is not to say the Colonel could not, through negligence
or wrongful exercise, have abused his discretion by enforcing the
regulation against activity “too far removed in terms of both distance
and time” to pass constitutional muster; we have already determined
the constitutional infirmity of the Colonel’s exclusion. But 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680(a) precludes action for abuse of discretionary authority
whether through negligence or wrongfulness. Since Colonel Nichols
had discretion in choosing to apply the regulation, the Government
remains immune from liability under 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).142

Turning to the second case in the circuit, Linder, the court faced the
question of whether a plaintiff’s plausible allegation of unconstitutional
conduct deprives the United States of its sovereign immunity, which is
otherwise preserved by the discretionary function exception.143 This suit
stemmed from the plaintiff, a deputy marshal, punching a fugitive’s
father in the face during an interrogation. This incident was
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investigated by the Marshals Service and the Inspector General of the
Department of Justice, and resulted in Linder being indicted on federal
felonies. The indictment was eventually dismissed as a sanction, and
Linder returned to work as a deputy marshal. Linder later filed a suit
against the United States under the FTCA, which the district court
dismissed, citing the discretionary function exception as its reason.144
The court of appeals agreed with the district court, first establishing
that the actions by Linder were discretionary.145 Next, the court
attempted to debunk the idea that no one has the discretion to violate
the Constitution.146 The court reasoned that the FTCA does not apply to
constitutional violations as those violations are not related to the FTCA
or its function.147 Instead, the court explains that the FTCA applies only
to state law torts, which is the reason the Supreme Court created the
Bivens remedy, which is a lawsuit for damages when federal officers,
acting under color of federal authority, allegedly violate the
Constitution in their employment.148
Despite the court’s position, Linder argued that no one has the
discretion to violate the Constitution or the discretion to commit a
malicious tort such as intentional infliction of emotional distress.149 The
court acknowledged this as true, stating that nobody should commit a
civil wrongdoing.150 However, the court qualified this by stating that:
unless §2680(a) is to be drained of meaning, it must apply to
discretionary acts that are tortious. That’s the point of an exception:
It forecloses an award of damages that would otherwise be justified
by a tort. Nothing in subsection (a) suggests that some discretionary
but tortious acts are outside the FTCA while others aren’t.151

The court concluded with the notion that just because legally created
discretion is misused, and a tort action created, does not mean the
United States is automatically liable.152

144. Id. at 1088.
145. Id. at 1090.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.; See also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). While the FTCA explicitly provides a statutory cause of
action for tort claims, Bivens actions provide an implied cause of action for violations
arising directly under the Constitution.
149. Linder, 937 F.3d at 1091.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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2. The Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit is the most recent court to deviate from the
other circuits with established precedent regarding the discretionary
function exception.153 Mackie Shivers, an older, and vulnerable federal
inmate, sued the United States after his cellmate attacked him.
Shivers’s cellmate stabbed him in the eye with a pair of scissors while
he was sleeping, leaving him permanently blind in that eye. Following
the attack, Shivers exhausted his administrative remedies before
bringing this FTCA suit. Shivers alleged that prison officials knew or
should have known before assigning the assailant to the cell with
Shivers that he was aggressive and had violent tendencies toward other
prisoners, specifically cellmates. Shivers claimed that the government
was negligent and that the government violated his right to be free of
cruel and unusual punishment.154
The court did not agree with Shivers’s arguments. Instead, the
district court dismissed Shiver’s FTCA claim,155 with the court of
appeals following suit and affirming the dismissal citing the
discretionary function exception as the reason for the dismissal.156 The
court’s reasoning behind its unpopular decision was rooted in the idea
that the FTCA and FTCA claims are not based on alleged constitutional
violations, as those are typically addressed under Bivens.157 Further,
the court stated that “[t]he inquiry is not about how poorly, abusively,
or unconstitutionally the employee exercised his or her discretion but
whether the underlying function or duty itself was a discretionary
one.”158
In its analysis, the court focused on Gaubert and Berkovitz, deducing
that because there was no specific source of law guiding the prison
guards, and because they were not acting contrary to any law or
regulation, their actions were discretionary in nature, whether they
were acting unconstitutionally or not.159 The court then focused on the
Seventh Circuit’s decisions in Linder and Kiiskila.160 In these two cases,
the court reasoned that the limited coverage of the FTCA meant it was
not designed to apply to constitutional torts.161 While the majority held
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that unconstitutional actions fall within the scope of the discretionary
function exception, Judge Wilson dissented, arguing that the FTCA
claim should not have been dismissed as the actions of the prison
officials did not fall within the discretionary function exception.162 His
dissent focused on the above-mentioned cases that fall within circuits
disproving unconstitutional actions falling within the discretionary
function exception.163
IV. ANALYSIS
There are two distinct routes this issue could go in, with one being
the obvious direction it should go in. First, the issue could simply stand
as is, with the Supreme Court of the United States or Congress opting
out of clarifying whether unconstitutional actions fall within the scope
of the discretionary function exception of the FTCA. Second, the
Supreme Court or Congress could elect to further define and
standardize what actions, specifically unconstitutional actions, fall
within the exception, and which actions fall outside the exception.
Taking both options into consideration, as well as the case law above
which defines the circuit split, and the current sociopolitical climate in
the United States, it is apparent the Court should act. The Court should
clarify whether unconstitutional actions by government officials should
be held to the same standard as unconstitutional actions of citizens, or
whether government officials will be shielded under the blanket of
sovereign immunity. Further, in its clarification of the standard, the
Court should in fact deem unconstitutional actions as nondiscretionary,
and therefore actions which fall outside the scope of the discretionary
function of the FTCA.
As discussed above, Congress created the FTCA to offer citizens a
way to seek damages from the government for tortious actions by
government officials.164 If the statute was amended or interpreted to
include unconstitutional actions within the exception, it would allow for
government employees to act both tortiously and unconstitutionally
with little to no path for a citizen to seek relief.165 Although the court
has wavered in its interpretation of the exception, including at times
extending it to government activity which would be inexcusable today,

162. Id. at 936 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
163. Id.
164. Lewis, supra note 1, at 1.
165. Brief for Stephen I. Vladeck et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff, D.J.C.V.,
minor child, and G.C., his father v. United States of America, 2020 WL 10867966, 14
(1:20-cv-05747-PAE).
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the court has never extended the discretionary function exception to
cover unconstitutional conduct.166
There are three reasons why unconstitutional actions should be
excluded from the scope of the discretionary function exception. First, it
was never the intention of Congress to excuse the government from
unconstitutional actions, or allow illegal actions to be deemed
policymaking discretionary actions, thus excusing liability.167 Second,
there are no other avenues for a citizen to seek redress from the
government for tortious actions by employees that violated their
constitutional rights.168 And lastly, the exclusion of unconstitutional
actions from the discretionary function exception of the FTCA would be
feasible with a workable test.169 Each of these points are easily
dissectible and on their own would not prevent the Court from
clarifying that unconstitutional actions have no place within the
discretionary function exception.
A. The Language of the Statute and the Intent of the Lawmakers
1. The Current Test is No Longer Enough
The Court has limited the discretionary function exception to include
only actions which involve an element of judgement or choice (the
exercise of discretion).170 The Gaubert test is the standard used by most
courts to determine whether actions were discretionary.171 The two
prong test requires that: (1) the action in question is one which requires
an element of judgment or choice, and (2) that the action was one which
the exception was designed to protect.172 The Court, through Gaubert
and Berkovitz, clearly delineates that the discretionary function
exception must be based on situations concerning true discretion and
authentic public policy interests.173 But the government, just as it did

166. Id. at 11.
167. Niles, supra note 46, at 1300.
168. Shivers, 1 F.4th at 939 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
169. Daniel Cohen, Not Fully Discretionary: Incorporating a Factor-Based Standard
into the FTCA’s Discretionary Function Exception, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 879, 897 (2018).
170. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 546–47. See also Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322–23 (the
discretionary function exception applies when the challenged government action involves
“an element of judgment or choice” and when the complained-of choice is “the kind that
the discretionary function exception was designed to shield”).
171. Shivers, 1 F.4th at 928–29.
172. Id.
173. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Patty v. United States, No. 15-1361, 2016
WL 2621681 (2015).
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before Berkovitz, continues to argue for an overly broad application of
the exception “that is tantamount to swallowing the rule.”174
Concentrating on the first prong, the Supreme Court has long held
that actions which call for transgressing the Constitution are outside
the scope of discretion.175 Under common law, a citizen who acts
unconstitutionally toward another is bound to be held liable for their
actions.176 This is no different for the actions of federal officials who act
unconstitutionally within the scope of their official duties.177 When a
citizen commits unconstitutional tortious abuse upon another person,
they are likely to be held liable.178 The creators of the discretionary
function exception did not intend for the government to be able to
excuse unconstitutional actions.179 An intent of that nature would have
rendered moot any need for the discretionary function exception. While
the argument for the inclusion of unconstitutional actions within the
scope of the discretionary function exception has merit, it disregards the
fundamental reasoning behind the FTCA and the exception.180
When considering the policy-protecting exception to the FTCA, all
discretionary function exception immunity is inhibited when a federal
government official crosses constitutional lines.181 Just as a federal
official does not “possess discretion to violate constitutional rights,”182
the discretionary function exception “does not shield conduct that
transgresses the Constitution.”183 However, there is a difference
between the constitutional barrier against claims of policymaking
discretion and the Supreme Court precedent that discretion is not
present when a federal employee neglects to follow a regulation or
statute that specifically prescribes a course of action.184
The difference hinges on the residual authority a federal government
employee possesses.185 Even if a statute or regulation does not offer
174. Id. at 5.
175. See generally Shivers, 1 F.4th at 924.
176. Lewis, supra note 1, at 1.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Lewis, supra note 1, at 18.
180. Amy M. Hackman, The Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort
Claims Act: How Much is Enough?, 19 CAMPBELL L. REV. 411, 445 (1997).
181. See Shivers, 1 F.4th at 937 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
182. Gregory Sisk, Federal Courts, Practice & Procedure: Recovering the Tort Remedy
for Federal Official Wrongdoing, 96 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1789, 1828 (2021) (quoting
Medina v. United States, 259 F.3d 220, 225 (4th Cir. 2001)).
183. Id. (internal quotes omitted)
184. Id.
185. Id.
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specific instructions for employees, the employee continues to retain
residual authority as an executive branch officer.186 On the other hand,
“when the Constitution precludes the action, whether or not that
constitutional command is precisely ascertained prior to application in
the particular case, the discretion is removed entirely, and no remnant
of general executive authority remains.”187 The authority of the
government and its officials is not infinite.188 It is much like a rubber
band which has an eventual breaking point.189 Thus, sometimes the
government takes actions that are beyond the scope of its authority.190
Addressing the unreliability of the Gaubert test, the Ninth Circuit in
Nurse serves as a valuable example of the need for unconstitutional
actions to be barred from the exception.191 The government employees
in Nurse were alleged to have developed unconstitutional policies which
discriminated on the basis of race.192 Because these regulations
required the weighing of policy matters, and because they involved a
judgement call, they passed the test with gusto and would have allowed
the government to employ the discretionary function exception.193
However, the court acknowledged the inability of federal employees to
be discretionary in their actions if they violate a legal mandate and
instead held that on its face, the complaint alleged actions that could
have been unconstitutional, thus opting to disqualify the use of the
discretionary function exception.194
2. Sovereign Immunity Was Never Intended to Include
Unconstitutional Actions
Along with the cases that fall within the majority umbrella above,
the opinion in Castro and dissent in Shivers offer further assurance
that unconstitutional actions should not be included under the
discretionary function exception.195 The prominent argument against
this is that an FTCA tort claim based on a tortious discretionary action
by a government figure is barred by the exception because the plain

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id. at 1828–29.
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Id. at 1000.
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language of the statute said so.196 Those arguing would go so far as to
say that even unconstitutional tortious abuse is excused under the
exception.197 But the case law says otherwise.
Further, in other instances, the Supreme Court has held that
unconstitutional actions do not fall within the scope of immunity.198 The
Court was faced with a similar situation in Owen v. Independence,199
where it addressed municipal immunity.200 “There, the Supreme Court
evaluated whether a common-law immunity for ‘discretionary’ functions
could protect municipalities against 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims where the
municipalities’ employees acted in good faith.”201 The Court explained
that the immunity doctrine was rooted in the separation of powers
principles; “it served to ‘prevent courts from substituting their own
judgment on matters within the lawful discretion of the
municipality.’”202
The FTCA and the discretionary function exception are similarly
based on separation of powers principles.203 The exception serves to
prevent “judicial second-guessing of legislative and administrative
decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy . . . .”204
Much like the contexts in Owens, when addressing actions under the
FTCA, there is no discretion to violate the Constitution.205 Judge
Wilson, in explaining the comparison of Owens to Shivers stated that
[U]nconstitutional conduct is necessarily outside the scope of the
discretionary function exception, just like it is outside the scope of
discretionary function immunity at common law. Therefore, the
discretionary function exception likewise cannot shield the United
States in an FTCA case where the tortious conduct at issue also
allegedly violates the Constitution.206

In his dissent, Judge Wilson provides it was never the intent of
Congress or of the Court to allow the government to commit tortious

196. Shivers, 1 F.4th at 936 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 937
198. See generally Pooler, 787 F.2d at 868; Nurse, 226 F.3d at 996; Raz, 343 F.3d at
945; Limone, 579 F.3d at 79.
199. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
200. Id. at 657.
201. Shivers, 1 F.4th at 938 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
202. Id. (quoting Owens, 445 U.S. at 649).
203. Shivers, 1 F.4th at 938 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 937 (quoting Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 814).
205. Shivers, 1 F.4th at 937 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 938.
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actions, unchecked.207 When a person violates the Constitution, they
forfeit their right to immunity as their actions were not prescribed in
the discretion authorized by Congress or the Court.208 Therefore, when
a government employee, acting on behalf of the government, violates
the Constitution through a tortious action, the government should
forfeit its right to immunity.209
B. Constitutional Claims Under the FTCA are Unique
The FTCA should include language, or be interpreted to explicitly
exclude unconstitutional actions, as other remedies for government
officials who violate constitutional rights are inadequate. As evidenced
above, the First, Third, Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. circuits have confirmed
the discretionary function exception does not extend to unconstitutional
actions. Further even in circuits where the majority held that
unconstitutional actions fall within the exception, there were judges
who wrote lengthy dissents outlining the faults within the view of the
majority.210 Judge Wilson of the Eleventh Circuit walked through the
above-mentioned hurdles in his dissent in Shivers.211
While a claim of constitutional transgressions alone are not enough
to trigger the FTCA, when there is a state tort claim coupled with
unconstitutional conduct, an FTCA claim exists.212 The constitutional
defect does not itself trigger or sustain the FTCA claim, instead it
merely serves to negate a discretionary function exception defense.213
Thus, the FTCA claim still only addresses the violations of state tort
law, not the alleged constitutional violations.214 For example, when
there are allegations that a prison official was negligent in
discretionary inmate housing, additional allegations of an Eighth
Amendment violation would be sufficient to preclude the application of
the discretionary function exception.215
A claim of unconstitutional action coupled with an FTCA claim is
uniquely different than a Bivens claim or a section 1983 claim.216 In an
FTCA claim, a party is attempting to hold the government liable for a
207.
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210.
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213.
214.
215.
216.

Id.
Id. at 937.
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tortious action committed within the scope of their federal
employment.217 In Bivens, the Supreme Court recognized the
availability of damages and injunctive relief for constitutional violations
committed by federal officers acting under color of federal law or
authority.218 Unlike the FTCA, which explicitly provides a statutory
cause of action for tort claims, Bivens actions provide an implied cause
of action for violations arising directly under the Constitution.219
Contrasting a claim under the FTCA, Bivens suits are filed against
federal officers in their individual capacities, not against the United
States.220 While certain aspects of FTCA and Bivens litigation overlap,
constitutional claims brought against individual defendants in a Bivens
action are beyond the scope of the FTCA.221 Claims against state and
local entities and officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or state law also are
not covered in the interpretation or application of the FTCA.222
C. A Proposed Test to Exclude Unconstitutional Actions by Federal
Employees
Excluding unconstitutional actions from the discretionary function
exception of the FTCA would be feasible with a workable test. A factorsbased test would be the clearest way for the Supreme Court to clarify
that unconstitutional tortious actions are not protected under the
discretionary function exception.223 The three proposed factors would be
(1) whether the government employee exercised a choice, (2) whether
the choice related to policy considerations, and (3) whether the
government employee’s conduct if performed by a private person would
be considered unconstitutional.224
The first factor, whether the government employee exercised a
choice, stems from the Berkovitz requirement that the government
employee must have had a choice in their tortious action.225 This broad
requirement focuses on the general concept of the word “discretionary,”
and looks at whether the employee had any discretion.226 The first
question looks at whether the employee was performing a ministerial
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action, where they would lack discretion, or whether they were acting in
a way that allowed discretion.227 The adoption of this factor brings the
concern that if courts were to strictly apply the choice requirement,
governmental entities would provide less guidance and regulations,
“because fewer directives will mean less potential liability.”228 However
this concern is misplaced as “the government does not decide on policy
as a means of avoiding liability–government functions to help resolve
collective action problems.”229 Thus, incorporating the “choice”
requirement from Berkovitz would, “do nothing more than align the
discretionary function exception with existing precedent; fear of
unintended consequences should not outweigh the judiciary’s duty to
clarify the scope of the law.”230
The second proposed factor revolves around “the nature of the choice;
the employee’s choice must be related to policy considerations.”231 Policy
considerations can be social, political in nature, or economic.232 This
requirement is broad, yet it tethers the employee’s decision to a broader
system that excludes employee decisions not reflective of the larger
organization.233 For example, choosing not to work is not protected
under the discretionary function exception because it is not a policyrelated choice, but deciding how to allocate sparse resources would be
protected by the exception because the allocation would pertain to
social, political, or economic considerations.234 The policy-related choice
requirement balances competing concerns behind the FTCA through
ensuring the government is liable for actions which fall outside the line
of its official duties, while protecting necessary government
operations.235
The third and last factor would deny coverage by the discretionary
function exception for tortious actions which violate the Constitution.
This added factor would allow the Supreme Court to clarify and enforce
the notion that the discretionary function exception was not created to
shield the government from all liability, including liability for tortious
actions which are unconstitutional. The discretionary function
227. Id.
228. Id. at 900.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 901; See Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 814 (“Congress wished to prevent
judicial ‘second-guessing’ of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social,
economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort.”).
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exception should perform much like the discretionary function
immunity at common law. “Therefore, the discretionary function
exception likewise cannot shield the United States in an FTCA case
where the tortious conduct at issue also allegedly violates the
Constitution.”236 Further, this factor would not limit the intended
purpose of the FTCA because the goal “of the FTCA was to pull back the
curtain of sovereign immunity as long as it did not impair the essential
government functioning.”237 The third factor is consistent with the
precedent in the First, Third, Eighth, Nineth, and D.C. Circuits, and
would offer a firm rule to end the current circuit split regarding
unconstitutional, tortious actions and the government’s liability.238
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court should revisit its interpretation of the exception
to untangle the confusion surrounding the current test and should
clarify that unconstitutional tortious actions fall outside the scope of the
discretionary function exception. The current wait-and-see tactic
employed by the Court is no longer working. Courts are becoming
increasingly split on the vague interpretations of the discretionary
function. Likewise, the silence by Congress over revisiting the statute
likely signals their approval of the judicial interpretation of the
discretionary function exception. It is time for the Court to break its
more than twenty-five-year silence regarding the discretionary function
exception. Further, the Court should restore the true intent of the
FTCA, holding the government liable for all actions by government
employees that fall outside the exception, including unconstitutional
actions. Thus, a clearer standard preventing unconstitutional actions in
a state tort claim against the government should be introduced. This
standard would hold the government to the same standard as citizens
under common law. Without a clear rule, courts will continue to rule as
the wind changes, with the government being liable in some instances,
but not others.
As shown through the divisive circuit split and the years of silence on
the issue, it is time for the Court to speak up about whether
unconstitutional actions should be interpreted to fall within the
exception. This split offers the Supreme Court of the United States the
opportunity to set clear precedent on the types of actions the
government will be held liable for, ending the seventy-six-year debate
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on whether unconstitutional actions fall within the exception, and to
establish a clear test for when the discretionary function applies, and to
what type of actions.

